This article examines legal and institutional aspects of the evolution of China's approach to the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization (WTO). It begins by analyzing the impact of China's changing attitude toward international law on the escalation of international economic law research. In particular, the article provides the first detailed examination of China's efforts to strengthen public-private cooperation in building its WTO legal capacity. China established think tanks to bridge the information and communication gaps between the government and industries. To develop its WTO lawyers, the Chinese government has consistently required international law firms to collaborate with domestic firms in major disputes and engaged the latter in third-party cases. Finally, the article evaluates China's assertive legalism strategy that enhances its recent participation in WTO rule-making and disputes against the US and the European Union. This research, therefore, provides a valuable case study for other emerging economies and the multilateral trading system.
I. INTRODUCTION
The primary indication of China's emergence as a global power is its astonishing growth since the 1980s. Today, China is the world's largest holder of foreign exchange reserves, the third-largest economy and a market that attracts $23,435 billion in foreign investments.
1 Even in the midst of the financial crisis, the economic growth of China contributed to more than 50% of global development. 2 China's trade has also elevated its position on the international stage, as demonstrated by the World Bank's recent decision to increase China's shares, that is, voting power, to the third place in the world. 3 China's economic success could not have been achieved in less than three decades absent its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. 4 WTO membership not only marks a milestone that signifies China's integration into the international legal order, but also poses new challenges to the world trading system. Many scholars have contributed to the literature on the importance of China vis-à-vis the WTO, primarily discussing the impact of China's WTO membership 5 or legal issues that arose in dispute settlement cases involving China. 6 Nonetheless, this article adopts a different approach by examining legal and institutional positions that indicate a significant shift in China's behavior within and toward the WTO. Its purpose is to show why and how China's skeptical attitude toward international law and tribunals has transformed to an 'assertive legalism' strategy in the WTO arena. To deter escalating cases initiated by the US, the European Union and developing countries that follow their lead, China has endeavored to build its legal capacity to handle WTO litigation. To bridge the legal expertise gap, China has strengthened public-private cooperation by establishing think tanks, known as WTO centers, to link local industries with the central government. To train Chinese WTO lawyers, China not only requires international law firms to work with Chinese firms in handling major disputes, but also engages local firms to participate in third-party cases. This 'learning by doing' approach has increased WTO legal capacity within the Chinese government and local law firms, thus enhancing China's 'WTO bar'. During China's 10-year WTO membership, the country has become increasingly active in WTO rule-making by submitting proposals to revise WTO rules and by appointing Chinese nationals to WTO bodies. China has also shifted from having a passive attitude to acting preemptively in its litigation approach, as demonstrated by a series of complaints that China filed against the US and the European Union from 2007 to 2010. China's WTO experience is important to other emerging economies and to the multilateral trading system. This article enriches the current literature on this topic for three reasons. First, it provides a case study regarding WTO legal capacity building in China, which is both a major developing country and an emerging economic superpower. To have been able to understand the challenges that China has encountered, the results of this article reflect a 3-year investigation based on original sources, as well as interviews and discussions with government officials, trade lawyers and academics. These individuals are Chinese and foreign experts who have first-hand experience with China's dealings with WTO affairs while working in their various capacities in Beijing, Shanghai, Geneva and Washington, DC. Secondly, China's experience offers valuable lessons for developing countries that face similar obstacles. These countries include those in the process of acceding to the WTO (e.g. Russia, Iran and Laos) and those that have joined the WTO yet lack substantial WTO experience (e.g. Cambodia, Myanmar and Vietnam). To some extent, these counties are comparable to China, as their embedded political structures invariably clash with cardinal free trade principles. China's experience in handling these clashes is thus important to them. Finally, the US and the European Union have adopted an offense-oriented strategy toward trade ligation against China. This research will help them gain a sounder understanding of political and institutional barriers jeopardizing China's compliance with its WTO commitments. It also demonstrates China's litigation strategy in the WTO and assesses whether China's capacity-building efforts may turn the balance of power in global trade.
This article comprises five parts. Part II examines the emergence of international economic study in China and its impact on China's development of expertise in international law. In particular, it explains how the country has shifted to a focus that enhances it legal capacity in handling trade litigation in the WTO. Part III identifies weaknesses in China's current legal education system and government structures that hinder its legal capacity building. It also provides an analysis of the government's approach to strengthening public-private cooperation by establishing local think tanks and retaining international trade law and local firms to assist the government in WTO disputes. Part IV offers insights into the Chinese government's role in WTO rule-making, and illustrates the evolution of China's litigation strategy in third-party, defensive and offensive cases and assesses the results of such cases. Part V concludes the discussion with the major findings concerning China's WTO legal capacity building and an outline of lessons other developing countries may learn from Chinese experiences.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW RESEARCH IN

CHINA
In order to understand China's development of international economic law expertise from a holistic point of view, one cannot ignore the history of the country's reception of international law. Chinese elites' study of international economic law and the practical application of knowledge in international organizations, including the WTO, signify a new milestone for China's entrance into the family of nations. This milestone also represents a shift in the Chinese attitude toward international law and, more notably, international dispute settlement mechanisms. From the Chinese perspective, while the admission of the People's Republic of China (PRC) into the United Nations (UN) acknowledges its legitimacy as the 'real' China, the country's WTO membership further affirms its ascended status on par with Western powers. century first exposed the ancient kingdom to the modern international legal regime. Yet, China's experience with international law was initially frustrating. China failed to deter Britain from importing opium into the country on the basis of international law. China's defeat in the Opium War by the British compelled its leaders to sign the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing, which was the prelude to a series of 'unequal treaties' with Western powers that led to China's century of humiliation. Ironically, the text of these treaties to some extent reflects modern-day WTO principles. The Treaty of Nanjing, for instance, requested that China abolish the 'monopolistic system of trade', promise the 'opening [of] ports . . . to British consuls and merchants', and the use of 'a fixed tariff'. 8 Most of the subsequent treaties also demanded unilateral 'Most-Favoured-Nation' (MFN) treatment, obliging China to grant whatever rights it conceded to the other powers under their treaties with China. 9 This unpleasant history explains why the Chinese perceived international law as 'reasonable but unreliable' and how the WTO-plus obligations to which China committed often led to a reminiscence of discriminatory treatment under past unequal treaties. 10 China's traditional attitude toward international law certainly influenced its approach to international disputes. From the Ching Dynasty to the beginnings of the PRC, China consistently refrained from appearing before any international courts and preferred negotiations over any form of binding decisions rendered by 'biased' courts dominated by the West.
11 This attitude was compounded by the PRC's Marxist-Leninist ideology that stressed the inviolability of sovereignty free from intervention of bourgeois 8 The Chinese approach to international law in the 1970s can be categorized as 'reception with silent participation'. During this era, the PRC did not challenge the normative validity of international law, but frequently questioned the universal application of such law. 17 China's sensitivity concerning its sovereignty did not decrease, and the Cold War conflict also made China hesitant to resolve disputes before international tribunals, let alone submitting to courts that mandate compulsory jurisdiction. 18 Active participation in rule-making, in either political or economic arenas, was not Beijing's concern.
B. International economic law as a new discipline
The economic reform that Deng Xiaoping commenced in 1978 resulted in a significant increase in foreign trade. Traditional international law research that concentrated on sovereignty, recognition and state succession was not adequate to meet China's need to understand new trade law issues. The academic debate on whether international economic law should be separate from public international law first appeared in the 1983 Zhong Guo Guo Ji Fa Nian Kan (Chinese Yearbook of International Law). 19 The debate caused the government to grant international economic law status as a new academic discipline independent of public international law. 20 20 It means that similar resources designated to international law research would be designated to international economic law. China's education authorities listed international economic law as a separate legal subject from international law in 1982, but merged public international law, international economic law and private international law as a subject entitled 'international law' in 1997. Ibid, at 278. The issue of whether particular legal subjects can be recognized by the government affects whether a law school can offer degrees with the specializations.
Chinese Society of International Economic Law was established. 21 It is now based at Xiamen University and has been a major impetus for the diffusion of international economic law. Not only has it held annual national conferences since 1992, but it has also published the Guo Ji Jing Ji Fa Lun Cong (Journal of International Economic Law) in Chinese since 1998, and it is considered to be an authoritative academic journal in China.
22
With the publication of China's first textbook on international economic law, written by Professor Liu Ding of Renmin University in 1984, 23 this new discipline soon attracted law scholars of the new generation. During the 1980s, most manuscripts on international economic law addressed the private side of international economic law with a focus on trade terms, contracts, investments, taxation and maritime law. 24 This academic focus occurred because Chinese enterprises often encountered private international economic law issues. WTO research was not a priority because Beijing did not plan to accede to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) until the early 1980s. In addition, with the government's support, Peking University began offering an LLM program with a concentration on international economic law in 1981 and Xiamen University established a PhD program on this subject in 1986. 25 The emergence and development of international economic law in China during the economic reform period not only paved the way for WTO research, but also influenced the government's approach to international law. First, China's public and private sectors prior to the 1980s were isolated from the global arena and had limited interest in following international rules. However, the economic reform compelled Chinese businesses to interact with rules governing transnational commercial transactions. The pragmatic needs of the private sector to understand such rules generated the government's interest in these 'Western' rules. The official attitude change was also reflected in the incorporation of international rules into Chinese laws. 26 Thirdly, China no longer viewed international law as a set of rules that contain multiple systems governing capitalist and socialist states, respectively. This 'unity' of international law facilitated Chinese acquiescence to such law and decreased China's challenges to the fairness of multilateral tribunals. It can be exemplified by the 1998 Sino-Barbadian Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), in which China for the first time agreed to allow foreign investors to resort to international arbitral tribunals without specific consent from the Chinese government. 27 Finally, China's development of international economic law boosted the international law research capacity in academic institutions in newly developed coastal cities in the South, including Xiamen University. This development widened international economic law research, and scholars studied new topics that included the PRC's trade relations with Taiwan, Hong Kong and Southeast Asian nations. international law in China because the WTO is the only international 'court' with compulsory jurisdiction that China accepted, and it is the only tribunal to which it has actually resorted. This is distinguishable from the preceding period when China's BITs allowed only 'private parties' to have access to arbitration tribunals. The WTO dispute settlement mechanism directly calls for enhanced WTO capacity building. In the initial years after China's accession, China's major trade partners gave China leeway in implementing its commitments and did not initiate complaints against China. 34 As Figure 1 shows, due to their rapidly growing trade deficits with China, these partners adopted a more aggressive attitude in WTO litigation. In 2004, the US filed the very first WTO case against China, challenging its exemption of value-added tax on domestically produced integrated circuits. 35 This case shocked the Chinese government and academia, and motivated them to reach a consensus to increase China's capacity in dealing with WTO litigation. They predicted that WTO complaints against China would be the norm rather than an exception. This prediction proved to be accurate because as of June 2010, five countries-the US, the European Union, Canada, Guatemala and Mexico-have initiated 18 complaints against China. 36 Remarkably, in 2007, China filed its first WTO complaint without any co-complainants, challenging countervailing and antidumping duties that the US imposed on Chinese paper-product manufacturers. 37 All of the seven cases that China has initiated were directed against the US and the European Union, 38 China's two major export markets. Beijing's litigation approach is aimed at overcoming the significant number of trade-remedy cases against Chinese enterprises. It also sought 'new' interpretations of those WTO-plus or discriminatory obligations to which China committed in exchange for WTO membership. 39 The transition of the government mindset in resorting to legal remedies also affected Chinese businesses, which had always avoided resolving disputes through the courts. For example, in Tza Yap Shum v Peru, Chinese investors for the first time sued a foreign government at the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in 2007. 40 The importance of the WTO prompted government officials and legal academics to make studying the WTO a priority on China's international economic law research agenda. publications that introduce the WTO, 42 Chinese scholars also focus on WTO dispute settlement cases, particularly those involving trade remedies. 43 Because the WTO is the only multilateral organization in which China coexists with Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau, publications that discuss legal issues involving 'one country, four seats' also proliferated. 44 China's keen interest in the WTO also increased the demand for experts in relevant fields and its academic institutions have responded. Currently, several law schools have established graduate institutes of international economic law, which offer graduate degrees on WTO subjects. 45 Wuhan University and the Shanghai Institute of Foreign Trade even launched independent colleges of WTO specifically devoted to research and teaching of relevant disciplines. 46 The China-EU School of Law, financed by the European But, as discussed in the next section, the proliferation of these programs has not yet efficiently increased China's WTO legal capacity in dealing with actual litigation.
C. WTO legal capacity building as a priority
Foreign contributions, particularly those funded by business associations, may not be entirely altruistic. WTO-related training events aim at 'teaching' officials how to implement WTO rules. This is important for foreign companies because the major problem they encounter in China has more to do with enforcement than the law. This is particularly true concerning intellectual property enforcement at the local level. From the business perspective, it is often the last resort to request that the home government initiate WTO litigation, given the time and resources that may be incurred. Consequently, the WTO training projects for Chinese officials could defuse potential WTO disputes at a much lower cost. Moreover, these events provided public relations opportunities by allowing foreign businesses leaders to interact with Chinese officials in charge of trade policy and large-scale government projects. As China is not yet a party to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement and hence not bound by its national treatment and MFN obligations, multilateral enterprises clearly understand the importance of building guanxi-personal connections-with government officials.
III. PUBLIC-PRIVATE COOPERATION IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
The analysis above provides evidence of China's new attitude toward international law and dispute settlement that has evolved from rejection, to reception, and finally to participation. Such involvement has been both politically and economically motivated. Although the Chinese notion of at http://wto.gsm.pku.edu.cn/cn/background.htm (visited 10 May 2010) (in Chinese). This institute focuses on WTO research and does not offer degrees. 47 The China-EU School of Law is under the China University of Political Science and Law.
Master of European and International Law at the China-EU School of Law in Beijing, at 6, available at http://ec.europa.eu/euraxess/links/china/docs/cesl_european_master.pdf (visited 2 May 2010). 48 The sponsors were the government agencies and embassies of the US, EU, UK, Germany, Australia and Japan; NGOs including the US-China Business Council, the Ford Foundation, and the Asian Foundation; and international organizations included the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank; and educational institutions, such as Georgetown University and Harvard University Kennedy School of Government. Brian L. Goldstein and Stephen J. Anderson, 'Foreign Contributions to China's WTO Capacity Building', The China Business Review 9, at 10-11 (January-February 2002).
sovereignty in the political sphere (in particular, territorial integrity) has altered marginally in past decades, the perception with regard to economic sovereignty has significantly changed, thereby facilitating China's integration into the global order. The WTO has undoubtedly played a pivotal role in this transformation.
A. The de-linking of legal education from the practice of WTO law As examined in Part II, the pragmatic need to understand the WTO galvanized the Chinese government and academic institutions to respond to such demands. Publications and academic programs have increased the focus on WTO research. Yet, China's WTO legal capacity still lagged behind other emerging economies, such as India and Brazil. A preliminary question is why Chinese legal education does not seem to be capable of producing WTO lawyers. 49 I offer the following explanations. First, Chinese law schools focus primarily on the doctrinal understanding rather than the application of legal subjects. In other words, vast educational resources were invested to make students 'understand' WTO law, but not to enable them to 'practice' the law. For instance, WTO-related courses often include the study of panel and Appellate Body reports, but rarely teach legal research and writing. WTO litigation is highly dependent on one's proficiency in oral and written English. In cases involving the US and the European Union, a solid understanding of their respective trade regimes and pertinent cases is a prerequisite. However, legal English and foreign law research training, including the use of legal databases such as Westlaw or Lexis, are rather constrained in Chinese law schools.
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This deficiency is also because most students in non-elite schools outside major cities have limited access to legal databases, law reporters and digests or libraries of international law including WTO subjects. Moreover, the de facto common law approach in WTO jurisprudence is new to Chinese instructors and students. This is not simply because of China's civil law system, but because most local courts' decisions are not publicly available and are rarely taught in schools. In addition to improving the country's fundamental legal mentality and infrastructure, an efficient way to address the shortfall may be to incorporate global moot court competitions into legal education. Competition on WTO Law, 51 model cases heard before the ICJ and the WTO, and would allow participants to develop research, writing and oral argument skills.
Secondly, the lack of 'practical' WTO training has been compounded by the fact that Chinese law professors usually possess no work experience prior to beginning their academic careers. A small number of WTO law professors have developed trade law expertise through taking on occasional projects from government agencies or their affiliations with WTO think tanks. 52 However, the Chinese government has frequently requested advisory opinions from them, offering them only limited remuneration. The official expectation is that law professors are public officials, and providing assistance to the government is an honor or political responsibility. 53 This mentality, along with underpaying them for legal services, has significantly diminished academics' motivation to participate in WTO litigation. Finally, although it is increasingly common for Chinese law students to pursue graduate degrees at Western law schools, these graduates do not plan to enter the government. students tend to join international law firms that focus on corporate work instead of litigation, to which trade practice belongs. 55 The fact that China's WTO legal capacity cannot benefit from these elite law graduates aggravates the disengagement between the academia and the government's handling of WTO disputes.
B. The role of think tanks to bridge the information and communication gaps Due to the above-mentioned weaknesses, China's legal education and academia have contributed more to the dissemination of knowledge about WTO law than to the increase of the country's legal capacity to handle WTO disputes. To address the problem, local governments established think tanks, known as WTO centers, to develop local WTO expertise and to bridge the gaps between the government, academia and private companies. These think tanks are governmental entities rather than independent NGOs.
Among the most prominent think tanks are the Shanghai WTO Affairs Consultation Center, the Beijing WTO Affairs Center, the Shenzhen WTO Affairs Center and the China-WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism Center. 56 These think tanks offer assistance to companies in which managers and employees had limited knowledge of WTO rules and minimal access to training courses offered by universities. These companies, usually of small and medium stature, most frequently encounter trade-remedy measures in export markets and do not know how to use the government resources.
safeguard matters, does not run a regular internship program. I do not know of any Chinese interns formerly or currently with this Division. 55 It is increasingly popular for Chinese students to pursue JD degrees in US law schools and seek to transfer from New York headquarter offices of their firms to Chinese branch offices. Because US-qualified Chinese lawyers are considered as foreign lawyers and cannot practice Chinese law in China, they mostly choose to be in corporate departments working on M&A matters. In addition, most Chinese branch offices of US firms do not have litigation departments and thus it would be more difficult for US litigation lawyers to relocate to China. Although the WTO centers receive subsidies for research projects from the ministries of the central government, including the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), they are primarily funded by provincial and municipal governments. What motivates these local governments to develop WTO expertise? China's WTO commitments require that both central and local governments revamp their legal regimes. Local government agencies and people's congresses would, therefore, need advice on conforming local regulations to WTO law, to which they have had little exposure. In addition, Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen are the prime beneficiaries of China's economic reform. Companies located in these cities contribute a significant share of taxes essential for the cities' financial base. It is thus essential for local governments to safeguard these companies' economic interests by helping them tackle trade barriers, both abroad and in China. There is an unwritten rule that city leaders' political career in either the bureaucracy or the Communist Party depend predominantly on their performance in generating economic growth, and this provides an extra incentive to enhance WTO legal capacity at the local level.
WTO centers fill the information and communication gaps for those in academia, industries and the government. They also, to some extent, substitute for trade associations in other countries. First, by holding programs and conferences, these centers disseminate WTO knowledge not just to students, but also to government officials and entrepreneurs.
57 Their websites also keep track of changes in foreign trade rules and WTO disputes involving China. Secondly, WTO centers assist private companies with 'identifying' trade and investment barriers. While local companies may 'describe' these barriers, they often do not know the technical WTO terms for such barriers (e.g. 'non-tariff barriers'), and this keeps them from expressing effectively the unfair treatment to competent ministries. 58 Legal experts at local WTO centers can 'translate' layman's language into WTO jargon and submit the materials to the MOFCOM in Beijing. 59 These materials are important to the ministry, as they serve as background information for questions posed to China's trading partners during WTO trade policy reviews. The information can also be included in the Foreign Market Access Report, which helps the 57 Thirdly, outside the WTO arena, these centers provide assistance to local enterprises in foreign legal proceedings. This is known as overseas weiquan, that is, rights protection. For example, with the assistance of the Shenzhen WTO Affairs Center, Netac Technology Co. sued PNY Technologies, Inc., in Texas, alleging that the latter had infringed on its patent rights. 61 This case demonstrates a unique but not an isolated example that shows the flip side of intellectual property infringement cases involving Chinese companies. In anti-dumping and Section 337 proceedings, 62 which Chinese exporters frequently encounter in the US, the WTO centers also provide a vertical framework that allows medium-sized companies to share information and lower litigation expenses by retaining joint counsel. Finally, these centers operate early warning systems related to potential foreign anti-dumping measures by monitoring export volumes to export markets and other data. 63 This system is crucial for local companies because 35% of the world's anti-dumping measures are directed against China, making the country the number-one target of such measures. 64 These functions performed by the various centers have contributed to China's WTO legal capacity building and made them a more effective link among major actors in the trade circle.
C. The operation of government agencies in response to WTO disputes
The think tanks cannot replace the government's role in the WTO, as participation in the WTO rule-making and dispute settlement is legally confined 60 to governments. To adapt to WTO accession, China's governmental structure has undergone a significant change. A salient reorganization was the establishment of the MOFCOM in 2003. 65 The MOFCOM merged the State Economic and Trade Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, which governed domestic and foreign trade, respectively. The division of work on domestic and foreign markets was the result of the planned economy, and the separate agencies could not cope with the market economy mechanism that the WTO mandates.
The government's legal capacity is essential to its performance in the WTO. Within the MOFCOM, the two units devoted to WTO tasks are the Department of WTO Affairs and the Department of Treaty and Law. 66 The Department of WTO Affairs serves concurrently as China's WTO Notification and Enquiry Center, 67 and it was established to comply with transparency obligations under WTO rules. This department is in charge of WTO-related work within the government, responsible primarily for bilateral and multilateral negotiations, and trade policy reviews. Nonetheless, participation in WTO disputes and negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) are within the purview of the Department of Treaty and Law. 68 The WTO Law Division under the department retains five to eight staff lawyers to deal with WTO disputes involving China. 69 In addition, China's Permanent Mission to the WTO in Geneva consists of 18 members. 70 The competition for entry into the MOFCOM has been rather intense, given that officials in the ministry are civil servants and enjoy high levels of job security. 71 The competition includes the qualification review, 75 In practice, there has been only one instance in which a Chinese company petitioned the MOFCOM under the Rules. The case was filed by the Jiangsu Province Laver Association to challenge Japan's restriction on Chinese laver exports. 76 Some may applaud the 'success' of the Rules because Japan reopened the market to laver from China in the following year. However, I would argue that this isolated case in fact exposes the weakness of the petition system, which makes Chinese companies reluctant to resort to the Rules, unlike their counterparts in the US and the European Union.
Two explanations underline why private companies have rarely resorted to the Rules. First, Chinese companies engaged in foreign exports are usually hesitant to retain lawyers to petition under the Rules for financial reasons. Most companies located outside the cities that establish WTO centers are unable to receive their assistance. Although the financial obstacle may be overcome by trade associations, active associations in China are rare in 78 This position ignores China's unique political structure and the fact that the Western concept of 'lobbying' does not apply in China. 79 Local companies usually have no contact with the central government. Moreover, members of the National People's Congress do not necessarily represent voters in their election districts due to the complex multi-layered election system. 80 These reasons explain weaknesses about the practice of the Rules.
Once China files a complaint or receives one from another WTO member, consultation is a prerequisite before the matter goes to the panel, as required by the DSU. 81 Lawyers at the WTO Law Division under the Department of Treaty and Law are responsible for the entire litigation process. This allocation of work is similar to the USTR model and different from the European Commission model, where legal work for consultation and post-consultation stages is divided between the Directorate-General (DG) for Trade and the DG for Legal Service. 82 The WTO Law Division also cooperates with other departments and divisions in pertinent disputes, including, for instance, the Intellectual Property (IP) Law Division in IP-related cases. In general, foreign law firms are rarely retained at the consultation stage, but are frequently involved in subsequent ones. 83 Chinese firms are, nonetheless, hired for both consultation and subsequent phases for almost every case. Individual lawyers in the WTO Law Division are paired up with external counsels in disputes. This cooperation enables government lawyers to absorb DSU expertise from experienced professionals, thereby enhancing in-house WTO legal capacity. Substantive litigation work, including legal research and drafting briefs, is primarily done by the MOFCOM and law firms in Beijing. Similar to most other countries, China's Geneva-based WTO Mission does not play a significant role in the actual litigation process because of its lack of legal professionals.
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D. Participation of external counsel in WTO cases
As noted earlier, China's WTO legal capacity is at the early stage of development. Compared with other states that have lawyers with WTO litigation expertise, the size of the legal teams within the Chinese government is about one-third the size of their counterparts in the US, the European Union or Canada. 85 The small number of specialized WTO lawyers, along with of the fact that they have much less WTO litigation experience, invariably leads to China's shortage of 'institutional memory'. This shortage hinders the lawyers' ability to deal with unwritten procedures established by customs. 86 Furthermore, legal professionals in the WTO Law Division of the Department of Treaty and Law become civil servants after they pass the public official examination. The 'value' of their prior legal experience, if any, is not reflected in their salaries or official rankings. In the US, the 'revolving door' is common between the government and private firms, which allows the agency to benefit from private experience at a low cost. 87 Nevertheless, a more common scenario in China is the 'one-way door': senior government lawyers often move to law firms, but not vice versa.
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In fact, there is no mechanism for senior private lawyers to join the government without taking the official examination with recent law school graduates. In this regard, Korea employs a more flexible mechanism that allows its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to directly recruit foreign lawyers, 84 Currently, Wenhua Ji (Second Secretary; PhD in Law, Peking University) is the primary official devoted to Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) matters with the Chinese Mission. 85 As mentioned in Section III.C., the WTO Law Division within China's MOFCOM has five to eight staff lawyers. usually US-qualified lawyers of Korean descent, to handle WTO litigation.
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China should allow similar flexibility in its official recruitment in order to attract experienced lawyers, both foreign and Chinese, to enhance its in-house WTO legal capacity.
The WTO Secretariat and the Advisory Centre on WTO Law
Considering the lack of in-house legal capacity, it is essential for China to gain additional assistance from external sources, as many developing countries do. The WTO Secretariat regularly provides technical assistance to developing country members. The Secretariat's technical assistance is, nonetheless, remotely useful in WTO litigation because it provides mostly training courses, instead of legal advice in actual disputes. 90 Some may refer to the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL), an international organization that was established to assist developing countries in WTO law. 91 I do not challenge the ACWL's contribution to ensure fair participation by those countries in WTO disputes. 92 It is, however, noteworthy that emerging economies, including China, Korea and Brazil, have showed no intention to join the ACWL.
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Why does China have little interest in the ACWL's 'relatively affordable' legal services? First, the ACWL is not mandated to assist countries in fact-gathering, which is crucial to China's WTO cases because most 89 Memorandum on Handling WTO Disputes by WTO Members, above n 85. The Ministry has gradually increased contract-based WTO law experts who went to domestic or foreign law schools. Unlike most Korean government officials, these experts do not need to take the official examination. Although the number of these experts is still limited, this flexible recruitment mechanism enables Korean professionals trained overseas to practice WTO law in the Korean government, thus increasing its legal capacity with limited cost. Discussions with a member of the WTO Secretariat (name withheld), 2006-2007; one anonymous reviewer also provided insight into this issue. 90 The WTO runs Geneva-based training courses and Regional Trade Policy Courses (RTPCs).
The controversial issues do not arise from statutes, but from their enforcement. Secondly, the ACWL possesses neither translation services nor Chinese professionals. This deficiency makes it difficult for ACWL lawyers to understand the operation of Chinese law. Thirdly, ACWL professionals lack economic expertise. They are unable to help a country assess whether it is economically viable to bring complaints. Even if a country prevails, the ACWL cannot advise how to retaliate against the industries of the losing party. This is particularly important to developing countries' use of cross-retaliation against developed ones, as efficient retaliation invariably depends on an economic analysis. Finally, the preferential rate that the ACWL charges provides a limited incentive for China. 94 The huge costs of WTO litigation per se constitute no deterrent for China to go to the WTO court. 95 Many other developing countries cannot fund the litigation expenses without the involvement of trade associations. 96 China is different. Its government agencies are de facto owners of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and all WTO litigation expenses are covered within the government budget. Therefore, the Chinese mentality concerning retaining external counsel is to prefer fully committed lawyers in leading law firms rather than seek the ACWL's assistance, despite the fact that it charges less.
International trade law firms
China is well aware that in order to litigate before WTO courts, it is essential to seek the assistance of experienced international lawyers. A common misunderstanding is that China did not retain foreign law firms until its involvement in WTO disputes. In fact, China first hired a foreign firm in the early 1980 s when it was involved in Jackson v. People's Republic of China, commonly known as the Huguang Railway Bond case. 97 This case concerned 94 For ACWL members, the hourly rates for WTO proceedings are divided by four categories, including Categories A to C and least developed countries, and range from US $ whether the PRC could assert sovereign immunity regarding unpaid principal and interest that arose from bonds issued by the Ching Dynasty to finance railroad construction. 98 China initially declined to appear before the US court, but then decided to safeguards its interests with 'foreign assistance'. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs retained a prominent US firm, Baker & McKenzie, which persuaded the court to set aside the unfavorable default judgment. 99 The shift in China's official attitude toward foreign litigation and law firms echoes my previous analysis regarding China's evolving view on international law and sovereignty in the post-economic reform era.
WTO cases are often more complex than domestic ones. Foreign law firms with WTO expertise are thus essential to China and other developing countries. Since the 1997 EC-Bananas case in which the Appellate Body found that a WTO member possesses the right to decide the 'composition of its delegation', 100 it is increasingly common to see developing countries represented by Western law firms. 101 Throughout the 15 years of DSU practice, certain elite law firms have formed a 'WTO bar' with a de facto monopoly on WTO cases. 102 A renowned example is Sidley Austin, which has represented Brazil in multiple high-profile disputes. 103 One crucial issue concerning employment of foreign law firms to represent developing countries is to select suitable ones, given that the quality of services and attorney fees vary. While many Washington, D.C., and Brussels-based law firms claim to have international trade practices, they are limited to handling domestic anti-dumping cases. For countries that lack WTO experience, it is often onerous to identify law firms that are capable of handling WTO cases. Unlike domestic judgments, WTO decisions do not bear the names of representative law firms and lawyers. Due to 'national dignity', some developing countries also intentionally hide such information because most, if not all, external counsels are Americans or Europeans. 104 Chinese companies are hesitant to accept the 'foreign' practice of hourly charges. To attract their business, it is not uncommon for foreign law firms to cap the attorney fees on a case basis. 105 Like those companies, the Chinese government also tends to limit the litigation budget. Thus, for WTO litigation, the MOFCOM's Department of Treaty and Law requests that certain international and domestic law firms bid for the right to represent. For foreign trade-remedy cases, the relevant chamber of commerce or the trade association sets up a 'beauty contest', in which invited firms are given 5-20 minutes to demonstrate their expertise and experience. 106 Potential respondents, usually SOEs, in those cases, may contact the firms that meet their expectations. This bidding process enables the affected SOEs to retain a firm 'at a very low rate'. 107 On the one hand, some firms have shied away from representing China because the low charge significantly compresses profit margins. 110 In these cases, Chinese firms-King & Wood and Hylands-were cost-effective for their fact-gathering, the Chinese law analysis and translations.
111 For third-party cases that involve less risk to Chinese enterprises' substantive interests, the government usually retains local firms, also through a bidding process. It is the government's goal that through working with foreign law firms and on third-party cases, local firms will accumulate WTO litigation experience and may one day represent China without foreign assistance.
Although the result of strengthening public-private cooperation remains to be seen, the 114 In my view, China's 'learning by doing' strategy to enhance its WTO legal capacity by involving local lawyers in WTO cases can bridge the 'one-way door' weakness in the Chinese government system and allow local lawyers to gain WTO expertise with minimum 'tuition'. This strategy may serve as a model for other developing countries.
IV. THE CHINESE WAY APPLIED IN THE WTO PRACTICE: 2001-2010
As discussed previously, China's awareness of the importance of international economic law began with its enterprises' pragmatic needs when interacting with the outside world during the economic reform. Since China's accession to the WTO, the world trading system has prompted the government to assume a more active role to safeguard its companies. Due to the overlapping interest of public and private sectors, the past decade witnessed the evolution of China's participation in WTO affairs. While the phrase 'aggressive legalism' has been suggested to describe some East Asian states' approach to the WTO, 115 a more accurate term for China is 'assertive legalism'. China's strategy in the WTO's rule-making and dispute settlement is not yet aggressive, 116 as it primarily aims to protect its legitimate trade interests by increasingly resorting to WTO rules. Its assertive legalism drew global attention because it is distinguishable from the country's passive attitude toward international rules and the WTO in the early days.
A. China and WTO rule-making Following China's initial exposure to modern international law, it found the Western legal order biased because China was barred from participating in rule-making. Interestingly, even after the PRC entered the UN and its affiliated agencies, its role was mostly to follow the rules rather than to change such rules, except regarding issues concerning its legitimacy or sovereignty. The Chinese 'UN mentality' predominated during its initial participation in the WTO, but this mentality has changed. In fact, it had to change because with the increased knowledge about the WTO, it has become a common desire among those in China's trade circle to become more actively involved in WTO rule-making. In China's view, an 'efficient' way to get involved is to have rule-makers of Chinese nationality. This approach has been applied in other international courts and tribunals. 117 While the DSU mandates that panelists and Appellate Body members be impartial in WTO litigation, these WTO judges' first-hand experience can benefit their respective countries' legal capacity. A panelist in the present case may serve as a government counsel in the next case. Furthermore, although it has official status in the UN, Chinese is not one of the three official languages at the WTO, and the Chinese government and academia must gain an understanding of WTO law by using translations. Having Chinese WTO judges share their experience could fill the information void for the country. Recognizing the importance of rule-making, in 2004, 2006 and 2010, respectively, China nominated a total of 11 WTO experts to be panelists, although so far only Zhang Yuqing was selected to be a panelist in EC -Bananas.
118 Moreover, in 2008, the first Chinese lawyer was nominated to the seven-person Appellate Body after a brief episode of Taiwan blocking her nomination. 119 It is likely that more Chinese will sit on the WTO bench and bring their experience to the government, particularly given that most WTO experts whom China nominated are either incumbent or former Ministry of Commerce officials.
Another circle that China is attempting to break into is the WTO Secretariat. Undoubtedly, WTO judges play a significant role in WTO judicial functions. Nevertheless, under the current system, both panelists and Appellate Body members are 'part-time' and most of them are not based in Geneva. The individuals who are exposed to the inside information related to the WTO are staff of the WTO Secretariat. In particular, legal officers from the Rules Division, the Legal Affairs Division (LAD), and the Appellate Body Secretariat (ABS) consistently assist panelists and Appellate Body members in cases. They gain insight into the process of judicial decision-making. Shockingly, despite China's status in the world economy, only five out of the 629 WTO officials are PRC nationals, including one serving in the LAD and the other in the ABS. 120 This is an extremely low percentage of WTO staff, especially in comparison with 181 French and 72 British nationals in the Secretariat. 121 The shortage of Chinese staff members in the Secretariat may be due to the French or Spanish language requirement. This creates a disadvantage for Chinese professionals because neither French nor Spanish is a common second language in China's education system. 122 To rectify this situation, China, along with other developing countries, recently submitted a formal proposal that called for increasing 'diversification of the WTO Secretariat'. 123 Although the result of the proposal remains to be seen, it indicates a start of Chinese engagement in the institutional change of international organizations.
With respect to the substance of WTO rules, China focuses primarily on those rules it deems unfavorable to itself, so it is inclined to join the negotiating coalitions made up of other developing countries. For instance, as Chinese enterprises are the prime target of anti-dumping measures, China has called for reforming the special and differential (S&D) treatment provisions in the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 124 In particular, China strongly advocates the abolition of the non-market economy status provisions in the agreement because foreign authorities tend to resort to such provisions to inflate the margin of dumping, thereby finding Chinese companies liable for dumping. 125 Regarding procedural rules in WTO proceedings, China also asked for S&D treatment in DSU negotiations, requiring developed countries to 'exercise due restraint' in cases against developing countries.
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This proposal can be understood in the backdrop of the dramatic increase in WTO litigation brought against China by the US and the European Union. In addition, China has proposed enhanced third-party rights, which, for instance, allow third parties to attend 'all substantive meetings of the panel', instead of only the first meeting according to the current DSU rules. 127 Third-party rights are of importance to China, as it is a cost-effective way for China's participation in WTO litigation.
B. China in WTO dispute settlement
Over the past decade, China has consistently made WTO legal capacity building a priority and endeavored to fortify public-private partnerships to enhance this capacity. Hence, it is important to examine the Chinese approach in handling WTO disputes and rule-making and assess the impact of its WTO legal capacity-building efforts in that process.
China as a third party
As with many other developing countries, China consistently participates in WTO cases as a third party. Since China's first third-party experience in US -Textiles Rules of Origin in 2003, 128 only 2 years after its accession to the WTO, the country has been involved in 67 cases as a third party. 129 As Table 1 shows, this figure surpasses that of many developing countries, such as Brazil, India and Korea, that joined the WTO much earlier. There are compelling reasons for China's third-party strategy. First, being a third party allows the government to gain a better understanding of the operation of 131 If a third party wishes to make submissions, it can address only the two to three key issues that it deems to be systemically important. As being a third party provides a good training opportunity, the MOFCOM consistently retains Chinese law firms to handle these cases. 132 Finally, participation in cases as a third party allows China to express its views on the interpretation of important WTO rules, thus facilitating its involvement in the rule-making process. The benefit of being a third party is exemplified in US -Upland Cotton in which the parties involved sought a favorable interpretation of WTO subsidies rules when they faced an impasse in negotiating such rules. 133 
China as a respondent
The accumulation of third-party experience certainly benefits China's legal capacity. This is particularly important to China because it has been a prime target of WTO litigation by other WTO members due to its rapidly increasing volume of exports as a result of its perceived unfair trade practice. This trend is primarily prompted by the fact that most of China's WTO commitments were phased in by the end of 2006. Thus, China's trading partners, especially the US, intend to hold China 'fully accountable as a mature member' in the WTO. 134 More importantly, the escalation of pressure
The Provisions not only legally fortify public-private partnerships, but also attempt to stop the escalation of domestic trade disputes argued at the WTO. Given the government's aggressive approach to WTO disputes, Chinese industries have become increasingly inclined to turn to the government. For example, in 2010, Chinese paper manufacturers requested that the government adopt actions immediately after the USDOC imposed unfavorable preliminary rulings on their exports. 152 This is distinguishable from previous experiences of anti-dumping or subsidies proceedings, where Chinese industries considered asking for the government's assistance only after the issuance of final rulings by the USDOC.
V. CONCLUSION
China's entrance into the family of nations occurred after it succumbed to the demand of Western powers to open its trade regime. This historical background and its Marxist-Leninist ideology noticeably contributed to China's suspicions about the modern legal order and international tribunals. While this hesitant mentality persisted, private enterprises' interactions with foreign trade rules during the economic reform era prompted the government and academia's interest in developing the study of international economic law. China's accession to the WTO provided a new momentum to this new discipline. The government's attention swiftly focused on enhancing its legal capacity building in order to cope with WTO disputes. The evolution of China's approach to WTO litigation is best depicted as assertive legalism. To protect its legitimate interests under WTO rules, China has transformed its initial passive attitude. As recent disputes demonstrate, China not only defends its cases vigorously, but also acts preemptively by filing cases against the US and the European Union. This transformation furthers its integration into the international legal order.
Although embedded weaknesses in its legal education and government structures pose institutional obstacles, China has developed its approach to enhancing its WTO legal capacity. Its experience provides valuable lessons for other emerging economies. The government's goal is to strengthen public-private cooperation in WTO disputes. Notably, local governments established think tanks, widely known as WTO centers, to bridge the information and commutation gap between the industries and government. They assist China's Ministry of Commerce in identifying foreign trade barriers, providing legal support for enterprises to handle litigation abroad and operating early warning systems to help companies avoid foreign anti-dumping investigations. To train its own WTO lawyers, China has consistently participated in WTO disputes as a third party, hence providing a low-cost opportunity for lawyers in the Department of Treaty and Law and Chinese firms to cultivate DSU expertise. The bidding requirement that compels international trade law firms to cooperate with local firms further upgrades the latter's litigation experience. China's WTO bar is therefore emerging.
China's 10-year experience as a WTO member has shaped the country's global vision. This emerging economic power has taken a more assertive role in shaping WTO rules and defending its political and commercial interests in WTO disputes. Although the success of China's WTO strategy remains to be seen, it can be expected that as the WTO transforms China's position in the international arena, China will continue to pose challenges and opportunities to the multilateral trading system. 
